

Small Wars Manual's Strategical and Psychological Principles in Philippine Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations

CSC 1997

Subject Area – Topical Issues

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: Small Wars Manual's Strategical and Psychological Principles in Philippine Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations

Author: LCol Ben D. Dolorfino, Philippine Navy (Marines)

Thesis: Success in COIN operation depends upon a clear appreciation of the nature of the problem and the consideration of Small Wars psychological principles.

Background: Published in 1935, the Small Wars Manual is a compilation of the vast wealth of knowledge of the U.S. Marine Corps from at least 180 Small Wars employments in 37 different countries during the first three decades of this century. Since most of these commitments were to quell lawlessness and insurrections, the Small Wars Manual is widely regarded as an authoritative doctrinal manual on COIN operation. The study focused on the manual's "heart and soul"-- its strategical and psychological principles, and looked how they relate to Philippine COIN experience in order to validate the thesis that success in COIN operations depends upon a clear appreciation of the problem and the consideration of Small Wars psychological principles. The choice of the Philippine experience gave depth and credence to the study, for it is one of the world's longest running COIN struggles.

The study has found that the most likely error of a government faced with insurgency is to treat the armed struggle as the "problem" itself when in fact it is just the "effect or manifestation" of the real problem which is always rooted on political and socio-economic causes. This was exemplified in the Philippine COIN experience when the government mistook the PKP-Huk uprising in 1946 as just another case of lawlessness requiring military solution. The same error was committed when martial law was declared in 1972 to contain the CPP-NPA insurgency. Although the military approach produced impressive tactical victories in terms of body counts and rebel resources destroyed, these were in fact strategic defeats. Consequent heavy collateral damages and human rights abuses only served to alienate the people from the government and contributed to the growth of insurgency. Short of victory, the PKP-Huk and CPP-NPA insurgencies were both suppressed by popular governments which recognized that the problem has deeper political and socio-economic ramifications. The COIN strategy of these administrations gave primacy to psychological dimensions by reforming the armed forces to improve its image, incorporating reconciliation and rehabilitation programs in the COIN effort, regaining the people's support through community oriented projects and services, and corrective measures to address the causes of insurgency. In conclusion, the Philippine COIN experience has clearly shown the workings and viability of the Small Wars Manual strategical and psychological

principles which espouse clear understanding of the nature of the problem as the basis of strategy, and clear appreciation of the important role of psychology as the pre-requisite for success in operations short of war.

Recommendation: In view of the ongoing revision of the Small Wars Manual, I recommend that the principles in Section II (Strategy) and Section III (Psychology) be retained since these are very important to success in COIN operations and other related operations short of war.

SMALL WARS MANUAL'S STRATEGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES IN PHILIPPINE COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

The term Small Wars is unknown to many today, but during the first three decades of this century it was the operational commitment that occupied the U.S. Marine Corps. The Corps was involved in at least 180 small war employments in 37 different countries prior to the doctrinization of the principles and lessons learned into what became the Small Wars Manual in 1935.¹ As far as the United States was concerned, these were military and diplomatic interventions under executive authority of the U.S. president to protect national policy interests in another state troubled by internal strife.² In essence, Small Wars cover the spectrum of the present day operations other than war. Since most of these interventions were made to quell lawlessness and insurrections, the Small Wars Manual is widely considered as an authoritative doctrinal manual on counterinsurgency (COIN) operations.

Looking into the historical background behind its development, one becomes more convinced of the wealth of knowledge that it contains about COIN operations. It was prepared at a time when there was a clamor in the Marine Corps for greater emphasis on Small Wars instruction in Quantico schools. Through the major effort of Maj Harold H. Utley, a veteran of Nicaraguan intervention, and his fellow Small Wars instructors at Quantico, the Small Wars Manual was published in 1935.³ The material sources used to compile the manual were “published articles, Small Wars lesson plans, and Col C. E. Calwell's 1906 book entitled Small Wars-- Their Principles and Practice, which contained guerrilla warfare experiences from such

places as Indochina, Cuba, Rhodesia, the Punjab Frontier, the Sudan, the Philippines, and sub-Saharan Africa."⁴ It was heavily spiced with Maj Uteley's Nicaraguan experience in fighting the Sandinista insurgency, and the Manual practically addressed the whole gamut of the subject from the causes of revolutions to the minutest detail of containing it. A revised version came out in 1940 and since then the Manual has remained in that form until today.

This study will focus on the manual's "heart and soul"-- the strategical and psychological principles, and how they relate to the Philippine COIN experience in order to validate the thesis that success in COIN operations depends upon a clear appreciation of the problem and the consideration of Small Wars psychological principles. The choice of the Philippine experience will give depth and credence to the study, for it is one of the world's longest running COIN struggles. The study focuses on the sixty five long years of the Philippine government's struggle to contain communist insurgency. The revolutionary struggle has been suppressed twice militarily, yet communist insurgency remains a serious threat to Philippine internal security today.

II. THE SMALL WARS MANUAL

Strategical Principles. In essence, the basis for strategy in Small Wars is a clear appreciation of the problem. This is because of the inseparable political and military dimensions in Small Wars in contrast to the purely operational concepts of regular warfare. The fundamental cause of the problem is often not military in origin, but on political, economic, and social inequities which constrains a sector of the population to rebel against the existing regime. The armed strife is the "effect" and not the "cause" of the problem.⁵ In Small Wars, the military effort is merely a part of the overall political effort. The application of force must be restrained

and used only to such extent to create a peaceful condition to allow the introduction of appropriate political and/or socio-economic corrective measures.⁶ In addition to combat operations, the military has to play an active role in non-traditional military measures to enhance its effectiveness.⁷ In essence, strategy must be adapted to the reconciliatory and constructive nature of Small Wars. Further, the fact that there can never be exactly the same situation requiring identical solutions underscores the importance of knowing the nature of the problem.

The military strategy is likewise shaped by the unique nature of Small Wars. There would be no clearly delineated battlefields. The enemy will usually resort to a protracted struggle strategy which places emphasis on political subversion and "hit and run" guerrilla tactics-- much like the Viet Cong used during the Vietnam War (1965-1973). One would be normally confronted with adversaries who do not conform with the established rules of war. When pressed upon, the guerrillas would blend in with the civilian populace. The army, therefore, would have to deal as well with non-belligerents who provide the moral and material support to the guerrillas. Faced with the highly mobile and flexible enemy forces, the army would normally be obliged to disperse its forces to patrol the countryside and control strategic areas. The key strategical principle is to beat the insurgents at their own game. In contrast to protracted warfare strategy, the army must seek a quick victory.⁸ Greater mobility and flexibility must be achieved over the insurgent force in order to avoid the pitfall of overextending one's forces.⁹ To be effective, therefore, one must fully appreciate the peculiarities of Small Wars.

Psychological Principles. The important role of psychology can never be over-emphasized considering the fact that Small Wars are primarily a struggle for the people's support. The troops must be indoctrinated of all attendant psychological considerations and must fully appreciate the

importance of proper behavior. The crux of the matter is to isolate the insurgents from their mass base-- the people. The concept is best explained by a popular dictum of Mao Tse Tung: "The guerrillas are likened to fish that lives in the water (people). Remove the water and the fish will die." In view of these, the Small Wars Manual prescribes this overarching psychological policy:

The aim is not to develop a belligerent spirit in our men but rather of caution and steadiness. Instead of employing force, one strives to accomplish the purpose of diplomacy.¹⁰

The best approach in employing psychological principles is to weigh the possible repercussions of contemplated actions. Primary consideration must be given in determining ways and means that will accomplish the given mission with the least application of force. In order to develop the skill in this art, the manual provides the following considerations: fundamental considerations, basic instincts, attitude and bearing, and conduct of troops.¹¹

Fundamental Considerations. No other type of military operation requires greater emphasis on civil behavior, justice, and humanity than in small wars. Being the representatives of the government or political entity who seek popular support, the troops must gain the respect of both the people and the insurgents. The manual prescribes the following important guidance:

1) Social customs such as class distinctions, dress and similar items should be recognized and receive due consideration; (2) Political affiliations or the appearance of political favoritism should be avoided; while a thorough knowledge of the political situation is essential, a strict neutrality in such matters should be observed; (3) A respect for religious customs.¹²

Revolutionary Tendencies. One who hopes to quell revolution must thoroughly understand how it develops and succeeds. Revolutionary movement often result from people's aspiration to change an existing political, economic, or social order whom they identify as the

causes of their hardships. "Discontent" is the common denominator of revolutionary struggles.¹³ Unless the existing political entity eliminates the causes of discontent, the movement will gather sufficient momentum to achieve success. The military struggle might be suppressed through military measures, but as long as the basic causes of discontent remain and the people's passion for change remains high, the insurgency will never die.

The revolutionary army does not need great strength to succeed.¹⁴ An explosive revolutionary situation can be created by a small group of political agitators who may take advantage of a highly unpopular issue or heinous event to induce mob reaction. For example, a fallen leader may be utilized to trigger a very intense hero worship to mobilize a large segment of the population to overthrow the existing regime. This was demonstrated in the Philippines when the assassination of political leader Benigno Aquino mobilized the people and eventually led to the downfall of the Marcos dictatorship. Another method is through the united front approach which gradually mobilizes the people by riding on controversial issues that demonstrate the illegitimacy and ineffectiveness of the existing regime. An agitated mass of people may attain sufficient enthusiastic energy which will render the regime's armed forces useless.

Basic Instincts. An important skill that must be developed is the ability to understand the behavior of people. This involves the study of basic human instincts such as self-preservation, self-assertion, self-submission, self-sacrifice, fear, and pride.¹⁵ This is complemented by a clear appreciation of the influence of environment and culture on the behavior of people.

Attitude and bearing of troops. Small Wars requires the greatest practice of judgment, persistency, patience, tact, justice, humanity, and sympathy. These traits are key to the

achievement of moral and psychological ascendancy over the insurgents. Troops must fully realize that they represent the "better state of things" that is being offered to the people.

Conduct of Troops. Being a battle for the "hearts and minds" of the people, the importance of proper behavior can never be over-emphasized. There are two guiding principles on the conduct of troops in Small Wars: (1) the objective is to achieve decisive gains with the least use of combat force and the resultant loss of lives; and (2) the relationship with the people must be based on tolerance, sympathy, and kindness.¹⁶

II. COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IN THE PHILIPPINES

The political, economic, and social problems that continue to nourish communist insurgency in the Philippines are to a large extent unhappy vestiges of the country's colonial past. These problems revolve around the highly unequal distribution of wealth which traces its roots to Spanish colonial days when large tracts of land were awarded to a few favored families in order to have centralized control of wealth.¹⁷ The vast majority of Filipinos found themselves as landless share-croppers who lived in eternal poverty and dependence on the landlord. The tenants' share of the harvest was usually not enough to make both ends meet for his family until the next harvest season. The patron-client arrangement, however, afforded security in case of poor harvest, sickness, or misfortune. Traditionally, the landlords took it as a moral obligation to help their tenants go through hard times by extending interest free cash or ration loans.¹⁸ This symbiotic relationship held on quite well in rural Philippines during three and a half centuries of Spanish rule.

Things changed dramatically for the worse during the American regime. Rapid progress in the 1920s saw the deterioration of landlord-tenant relationship. This was mostly felt in the

highly agricultural central and southern Luzon where the incidence of land tenancy was high. With the rise of capitalism, the traditional paternalistic attitude of landlords became businesslike as maximum "earnings and profits" became the motive of production.¹⁹ The landlords became impersonal and hardly accessible for help as they now preferred to live in the comforts of towns and cities. They stopped giving interest free loans. Suddenly, the tenants found their lives miserable and insecure as they became prey to loan sharks who charge 50-150 % interest rates. The situation became explosive when landlords started to answer incessant peasant demands for social justice with armed repression.

The rapid population growth brought by improved health and sanitation standards further compounded the problem. Job opportunities were scarce, so availability of farm lands became a matter of stiff competition among the peasantry. The unrestricted flow of American consumer goods into the country stifled industrial growth which otherwise could have created job openings for the rapidly growing population.²⁰ The priority of the colonial government was the production of cash crops and raw materials demanded by American factories back home.

The American preference for members of the aristocracy in filling the government bureaucracy solidified the unhealthy gap between the rich and the poor, and hampered the emergence of a middle class which could have otherwise provided a secure base for democracy.²¹ It afforded the aristocracy political power which only served to perpetuate the widely stratified social order.

In view of the seemingly hopeless situation, the peasants began to organize themselves for mutual protection, ironically, from the government and its constabulary which were supposed to be their protectors. This was the prevailing situation when the Partido Komunista ng

Pilipinas (PKP) was organized on August 26, 1930.²² Pro- Soviet in orientation and composed of urban intellectuals, the party was initially concerned with organizing the urban workers and showed little interest on what was happening in the countryside. In 1932, the PKIP was outlawed because of its overt subversive activities.²³ Later, the Socialist Party of peasant origin came into being in central Luzon. On November 7, 1938, the PKP and the Socialist Party were merged through the effort of James Allen, an American communist.²⁴ In effect, this solidified communist influence on the Philippine peasantry.

World War II gave the PKP its "teeth" when affiliated peasant organizations in central Luzon rose to arms against the Japanese invaders. The guerrilla army was named the Hukbong Bavan Laban sa Hapon (People's Army Against Japan), or HUKBALAHAP for short.²⁵ When the Americans came back, they helped pave the way for the liberation of Luzon.

In an ironic turn of events after the war, General MacArthur did not recognize the HUKBALAHAP as a legitimate guerrilla organization because of its leftist leanings and rift with U.S.- led guerrilla units during the war. Its leaders were arrested and imprisoned purportedly for war crimes. Their faith in the democratic process was finally broken when their six winning congressional candidates in the 1947 elections were refused their seats in the newly formed Philippine Congress. This was an apparent maneuver to gain the necessary majority votes in the projected amendment of the constitution that would grant economic parity rights to American citizens in accordance with the U.S. Bell Trade Act.²⁶ Exhausted of legal means to defend themselves, the HUKBALAHAP veterans rose into open armed rebellion in defiance of the PKP Central Committee's guidance. It took another year before the PKP reversed its decision and

took active leadership of the rebellion. The revolutionary army was renamed Hukbong Makapagpalaya sa Bayan (People's Liberation Army), or Huks for short.

The combined effect of economic hardships after the war and the loss of faith in the government contributed to the rapid growth of PKP-Huk insurgency in central and southern Luzon in the late 1940s. The government's "mailed fist" response to the rebellion brought untold sufferings and destruction in the countryside, and only alienated the government from the people in the affected areas. By 1950, the Huks reached an armed strength of 12,000 to 13,000 and mass base support of over 100,000 peasants.²⁷

The period from 1951 to 1954 saw the rapid decline of the PKP-Huk rebellion. While there were strategic and tactical shortcomings on the part of the PKP-Huk leadership, the quelling of the rebellion was attributed to a large extent on the effective COIN operation of a reformed armed forces and the advent of a popular government under President Ramon Magsaysay, the only Philippine president who came from humble origins. These successes will be detailed later in this analysis.

The reforms undertaken by the government were cut short by the death of President Magsaysay in 1957. Lulled by the relatively peaceful condition, the succeeding administrations showed uncaring attitude to alleviate the country's worsening poverty problem. The living conditions of the great majority of Filipinos turned from bad to worse as real wages plunged by a third in the 1970s compared to the level twenty years before.²⁸

In the 1960s, growing nationalism and worldwide student unrest in protest of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam stirred the Philippine campuses. Inspired by the success of the Chinese communist revolution, radical students studied the works of Mao Tse Tung. In the process, they

learned the striking similarities of pre-communist China to the conditions in the country such as the deterioration of landlord-peasant relationship due to rise of capitalism; miserable life of peasants due to perpetual indebtedness; use of the military and private armies to control peasants unrests; uncaring attitude of the land-owning class dominated bureaucracy; and growth in urban poor population due to quest for jobs in the cities.²⁹ The early 1960s saw the nationwide growth of two prominent leftist student organizations, the Kabataang Makabayan (Nationalist Youth) and the Samahang Demokratikong Kabataan (Democratic Youth Movement). Crackdown of members when Martial Law was declared in 1972 resulted in a vast reservoir of hard-core, intellectual leaders for the communist movement.

On December 26, 1968, eleven young radicals led by Jose Ma. Sison, an English literature professor at the University of the Philippines, formed the new Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). Unlike the pro-Soviet PKP, they adopted the Maoist formula of protracted armed struggle from the countryside to eventually transform the country into a socialist state.³⁰ They envisioned a three-stage insurgency strategy: (1) strategic defensive; (2) strategic stalemate; and (3) strategic offensive. The protracted struggle was to be carried out by a two-pronged effort: (1) political mobilization through a united front approach; and (2) armed struggle through peasant uprising from the countryside.³¹ Mindful of the PKP-Huk major error of a localized uprising, they aimed to expand throughout the archipelago to disperse the armed forces.

The National Democratic Front was the umbrella organization to implement the united front concept. It sought to create a broad national coalition of front and sectoral organizations.

For its armed struggle, the CPP found its support from Dante Buscayno, a Huk cadre

who rebelled from the criminal activities of his comrades.³² On March 29, 1969, marking the 27th Huk foundation day, the New People's Army (NPA) was formed from the ragtag band with Dante which at the time had in its armory about 70 firearms.³³

In 1972, President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law citing open communist and Muslim rebellion to justify his action. The succeeding period until Marcos' ouster in 1986 saw the phenomenal expansion of the NPA. From a handful of demoralized Huks at its inception, it grew to approximately 22,500 armed regulars operating in 62 of the country's 73 provinces by 1986.³⁴ Contributory to this was the pre-occupation of the armed forces with the Muslim secessionist rebellion in the south during the 1970s, and the worsening political and socio-economic situation during the corrupt and repressive Marcos rule.

From its peak strength in 1986, the CPP-NPA insurgency saw a rapid decline in the same fashion suffered by its predecessor in the 1950s. They became politically isolated for a while when they committed the grave error of not participating in the peaceful people's uprising that ousted Marcos. Their popularity as an instrument of change waned as the majority of the people saw hope in the new democratic space offered by the popular Corazon Aquino government. The military's role in the ouster of Marcos revived its credibility and its new approach to counterinsurgency gave telling effects on the insurgent movement. By 1994, the NPA armed strength was reduced sharply from 22,500 to 6,937 and the influenced villages went down from 987 to 625.³⁵ Severe debate over strategy, bloody purges, and the inevitable power play that followed this strategic debacle resulted in the split of the CPP-NPA into three factions.

III. THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Initially, the Philippine government approached the PKP-Huk uprising as though it was

a series of "criminal acts," not a deeply rooted insurrection.³⁶ Hence, it was addressed with purely police and military actions. The government took a highly coercive and destructive approach-- a mailed fist strategy. Most often, military operations harmed the civilians more than the insurgents and thus only served to further alienate the people. Military units were reactive in nature and focused on the passive defense of towns and vital installations. The troops were generally antagonistic and abusive in dealing with the rural people. They treated suspected Huk sympathizers inhumanely.³⁷ Poor pay forced them to be corrupt and dependent on the already impoverished villagers for subsistence.

In the early 1950s, the effective team up of Ramon Magsaysay as the Secretary of Defense and LCol Edward Landsdale, USAF, a Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group member in the Philippines, reversed the situation in favor of the government. The strategic, institutional, and tactical changes that the duo engineered in the armed forces made great strides toward success. At the strategic level, they underscored the crucial role that the military plays in the total government effort. Magsaysay stressed that: "Whatever it was that hurt me most as a guerrilla is what we are going to do now to the Huks."³⁸ From the top to bottom, he got rid of incompetent, corrupt, and abusive military personnel to improve the image of the armed forces. He emphasized that the soldier's primary role was as an ambassador of goodwill to the rural folks with its secondary role being the destruction of the Huks.³⁹

A total government COIN effort was fully implemented when the popular Magsaysay was elected president in 1954. Government programs including agricultural technical assistance, credit institutions for peasants, rural health facilities, agrarian courts to settle landlord-tenant disputes, and infrastructure projects were poured into Huk infested areas.⁴⁰ The centerpiece of

the government's attraction policy was the Economic Development Corps program which promised modest farm lots to repentant Huks.⁴¹ Coupled by efforts of the revitalized armed forces, the rebellion collapsed with the surrender of the entire PKP political leadership in 1954.

The government response to the reemergence of communist insurgency in 1968 was a repeat of the error committed in the late 1940s. The declaration of martial law in 1972 is often referred to as the gravest error committed in the entire Philippine COIN campaign. The repression, abuses, and curtailment of civil liberties that went with this militaristic approach only served to fuel the insurgency. Any COIN efforts of the armed forces, good as they may be, were negated by their bad image as the protector of the Marcos dictatorship.

Reminiscent of the Magsaysay's era in the 1950s, things changed for the better with the advent of the popular Aquino government in 1986. The government initially took a reconciliatory approach in the hope of enticing the insurgents to renounce the armed struggle and participate in the new democratic environment. The subsequent peace negotiation was, however, a failure as the CPP-NPA demanded an unacceptable coalition government.

A significant development during this lull period were the reforms and massive reindoctrination program that were carried out in the armed forces. In effect, these significantly improved the morale and discipline of military personnel. Their image improved and they were better prepared when President Aquino unleashed them for a renewed COIN campaign in 1987.

The new COIN strategy, codenamed MAMAYAN (People), was similar to the Marcos era "clear, hold, consolidate, and develop" strategy with the exception of the addition of the National Reconciliation and Development Program which offered rehabilitation and livelihood to rebel surrenderees.⁴² In 1987, the government took a more active role in the COIN effort with

the creation of the Peace and Order Council (POC) at all levels of government.⁴³ The POC is an umbrella organization which coordinates the efforts of government agencies, the police/military, and private/sectoral/non-government organizations in the maintenance of peace and order. In effect, COIN became a concerted effort of the government, military, and people.

In 1988, the armed forces launched its COIN Campaign Plan, LAMBAT BITAG (Fishnet). It espoused a quick victory strategy as opposed to the CPP-NPA protracted warfare strategy. Instead of an all-out nationwide effort which diluted the armed forces' capabilities, COIN operations were concentrated on prioritized guerrilla fronts constricting the insurgents at pre-determined areas. Key to success was the triad of mobile combat operation, intelligence, and civil-military operation. Shaping operations were conducted by Special Operations Teams (SOT's), squad sized mixes of intelligence, psyops, and special warfare specialists. The SOT's were tasked to counter-organize NPA influenced villages and establish village intelligence networks. Cleared areas were turned over to the police commands and/or para-military units.

The NPA was considered strategically defeated by 1994. By December of that year, the armed forces launched Campaign Plan UNLAD BAYAN (National Development) to dovetail with the national development strategy of Philippines 2000.

IV. CONCLUSION

The most likely error of a government faced with insurgency is to mis-diagnose and mis-treat the problem. This was exemplified when the Philippine government mistook the PKP-Huk uprising in 1946 as just another case of lawlessness requiring military resolution. The same error was committed when martial law was declared in 1972 to contain the CPP-NPA insurgency. The government responded with the sheer use of military force. Although this produced impressive

tactical victories in terms of body counts and rebel resources destroyed, these were in fact strategic defeats. Consequent collateral damages and human rights abuses only served to alienate the people from the government and contributed to the growth of insurgency.

In the early 1950s, an enlightened government realized fully that insurgency has deeper political and socio-economic ramifications, however, it relied solely on the psychological impact of superficial reforms and programs. In effect, the insurgency was only partly subdued and continued to prosper underground. What was achieved was military victory, a condition of peace as described in the Small Wars Manual that could have paved the way for the elimination of the root causes of the insurgency.

The current total COIN strategy involving the government, military, and people is the result of full situational awareness of the CPP-NPA problem. The reforms made in the armed forces, and innovations in COIN tactics are reflective of the manual's psychological principles. All these contributed to the strategic defeat of the CPP-NPA in 1994. The ultimate success rests on the capability of the armed forces to maintain peace and the political will to sustain the ongoing socio-economic programs designed to eliminate the causes of communist insurgency in the Philippines.

In conclusion, the Philippine COIN experience has shown the workings and viability of the Small Wars Manual strategic and psychological principles. While success in COIN operations depends on many inter-related factors, a clear appreciation of the nature of insurgency problem and the consideration of the Small Wars psychological principles are the proper starting blocks.

Notes: ¹Field Manual (NAVMC) 2890, Small Wars Manual (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1987), 2.

²Field Manual, 1.

³LCol Richard J. Macak, Jr., USMC, "Lesson From Yesterday's Operations Short of War," Marine Corps Gazette, November 1996, 60.

⁴Macak, 60-61.

⁵Abdul Harris Nasution, Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare (New York, NY: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), 100.

⁶Field Manual, 15-16.

⁷Field Manual, 16.

⁸Field Manual, 13.

⁹Field Manual, 14.

¹⁰Field Manual, 18

¹¹Field Manual, 19-32.

¹²Field Manual, 19.

¹³Field Manual, 20.

¹⁴Field Manual, 21.

¹⁵Field Manual, 23-26.

¹⁶Field Manual, 32.

¹⁷ Albert Ravenholt, The Philippines: A Young Republic on the Move (Lancaster, PA: Lancaster Press, Inc., 1962), 42.

¹⁸ Benedict J. Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 7.

¹⁹ Kerkvliet, 25.

²⁰ Kerkvliet 23.

²¹ Day, The Philippines: Shattered Showcase of Democracy (New York, NY M. Evans and Company, Inc., 1974), 85.

²² Maj Lawrence M. Greenberg, The HUKBALAHAP Insurrection, Case Study, (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1987), 10.

²³ Greenberg, 10.

²⁴ LCol Librado S. Ladia, PN(M), A Communist Philippines If..., Student Paper (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Command and Staff College, March 23, 1988), 1.

²⁵ Maj Rodney S. Azama, USA, The Huks and the New People's Army: Comparing Two Postwar Filipino Insurgencies, Student Paper (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Command and Staff College, April 26, 1985), 14.

²⁶ The Philippines Reader, 1st ed., ed. by Daniel B. Schiemer and Stephen Roskamm Shalom (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1987), 92-93.

²⁷ Azama 26.

²⁸ Philippines Reader, 125.

²⁹ Jean Chesneaux, Peasant Revolts in China 1840-1949, trans. by C.A. Curwen (New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1973), 78-80.

³⁰ William Chapman, Inside the Philippine Revolution (New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Company, 1987), 11.

³¹ Philippines: A Country Study, 4th ed., ed. by Ronald A. Delan (Washington, DC: Federal Research Div., Library of Congress, 1993), 281.

³² Azama 29.

³³ Chapman, 11.

³⁴ Philippines, 252.

³⁵ Armed Forces of the Philippines Annual Report (Quezon City, PI: Committee on Research and Evaluation, OSJS, GHQAFP, 1994), 6.

³⁶ Greenberg, 68.

³⁷ Greenberg, 77.

³⁸ Greenberg, 87.

³⁹ Greenberg, 87.

⁴⁰ Kerkvliet, 23 8-239.

⁴¹ Kerkvliet, 239.

⁴² Philippines 254.

⁴³ Philippines, 255.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Armed Forces of the Philippines Annual Report. Quezon City, PI: Committee on Research and Evaluation, OSJS, GHQAFP, 1994.

Azama, Maj Rodney S., USA. The Huk and the New People's Army: Comparing Two Postwar Filipino Insurgencies. Student Paper. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1985.

Chapman, William. Inside the Philippine Revolution. New York, NY: W. W. Norton and Company, 1987.

Chesneaux, Jean. Peasant Revolts in China 1840-1949. trans. by C.A. Curwen. New York, NY: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1973.

Day, Beth. The Philippines: A Shattered Showcase of Democracy. New York, NY: M. Evans and Company, Inc., 1974.

Field Manual (NAVMC) 2890, Small Wars Manual. Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1987.

Greenberg, Maj Lawrence M. The HUKBALAHAP Insurrection. Case Study. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1987.

Kerkvliet, Benedict J. The Huk Rebellion. Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1977.

Ladia, LCol Librado S. A Communist Philippines If... Student Paper. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1988.

Macak, LCol Richard J., USMC. "Lessons From Yesterday's Operation Short of War: Nicaragua and the Small Wars Manual." Marine Corps Gazette. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Association, 1996.

Nasution, Abdul Harris. Fundamental of Guerrilla Warfare. New York, NY: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965.

Phillippines: A Country Study, 4th ed., ed. by Ronald A. Delan. Washington, DC: Federal Research Div., Library of Congress, 1993.

Ravenholt, Albert. The Philippines: A Young Republic on the Move. Lancaster, PA: Lancaster Press, Inc., 1962.

The Philippines Reader, 1st ed., ed. by Daniel B. Schirmer and Stephen Rosskamm Shalom. Boston, MA: South End Press, 1987.